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Do Treasury and the Service Have to Explain
Their Choices?
By Steve R. Johnson*

T

he validity of tax regulations has been challenged by taxpayers almost as long as there have been tax regulations. Now,
however, we are in a period of unusually high activity on this front. The Supreme Court recently upheld the validity of a
regulation under section 3121 in Mayo Foundation for Medical Ed. and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011); many
cases are testing the validity of regulations extending the six-year statute of limitations under section 6501(e) to basis overstatements (or, as the Service would put it, clarifying the law in this regard); and many cases are testing the validity of regulations
imposing a two-year limitations period on claims for equitable spousal relief under section 6015(f).
(One of the section 6501(e) cases is
discussed in my article, Intermountain
and the Importance of Administrative
Law in Tax Law, Tax Notes, Aug. 23,
2010, at 837. Mayo and other cases are
discussed in my article, Mayo and the
Future of Tax Regulations, published in
the March 28 issue of Tax Notes.)
This article addresses an interesting
and potentially significant aspect of one
of the cases involving the section 6015(f)
regulations. The Tax Court has repeatedly
held the regulation in question, section
1.6015-5(b)(1), to be invalid, and the
action has shifted to the circuit courts.
The Sixth Circuit has yet to weigh in. Hall
v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 19
(2010), on appeal No. 10-2628 (6th
Cir.). Two other circuits have. Three-judge
panels have reversed the Tax Court and
upheld the validity of the regulation in
Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d 479
(7th Cir. 2010), rev’g 132 T.C. 131
(2009), and Mannella v. Commissioner,
2011 WL 149379 (3d Cir. Jan. 19,
2011), rev’g 132 T.C. 196 (2009).
Five of the six judges on the Lantz and
Mannella appellate panels saw the
regulation as valid. The sole exception
was Judge Ambro in Mannella. Like the
other five appellate judges, Judge Ambro
rejected the Tax Court’s view that the
regulation is invalid at Chevron Step One.
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
Instead, Judge Ambro thought the
regulation invalid on a different theory:
that the regulation fails at Chevron Step
Two because “the IRS has not advanced
any reasoning for its decision to impose
a two-year limitations period on
taxpayers seeking relief under [6015(f)],
leaving us no basis to conduct the
analysis mandated by Chevron step two.”
2011 WL 149379 at *11. A month after
Mannella, the Court of Federal Claims
rejected a “failure to explain” challenge
to a regulation under section 263A.
Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United
States, 2011 WL 722970, at *21-22
(Ct. Fed. Cl. Feb 25, 2011).
This Article addresses the “failure to
explain” argument. Part I describes the
administrative law obligation on
agencies to explain the bases of their
regulatory choices. Part II evaluates that
obligation in the Mannella–Lantz–Hall
context. Part III addresses the potential
of the “failure to explain” argument
when taxpayers challenge tax regulations in other contexts.

I. Agencies’ Obligation
to Explain
Numerous cases have held that
administrative agencies are required to
explain why they made the regulatory
choices they did and that the agency’s

position can be reversed or, more
frequently, remanded to the agency for
better explanation before the position or
rule can become effective. Judges and
commentators have looked to various
sources as the basis of the obligation to
explain, including the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) (5 U.S.C.
§§ 553(c), 557(c), or 706(2)), administrative common law, Chevron Step Two,
or the U.S. Constitution, including the
delegation doctrine, other aspects of the
separation of powers principle, and the
Due Process and Equal Protection
components of the Fifth Amendment.
Wherever the obligation may be
located, numerous cases have invoked
it. Some of the cases predated the
proliferation of agencies in the New
Deal Era. E.g., American Express Co. v.
South Dakota ex rel. Caldwell, 244 U.S.
617 (1917).
Another plank in the doctrine was
added by the Chenery cases decided
near the time of the enactment of the
APA. It is settled that a statute can be
upheld—even if Congress articulated no
reason (or a constitutionally defective
reason) for it—as long as the court can
devine or devise an acceptable reason.
Similarly, an appellate court can affirm a
lower court’s decision—even if the
decision rests on an erroneous foundation—if the appellate court can identify a
sufficient alternative rationale. Chenery
teaches that this is not the case with
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respect to acts by agencies: “an
administrative order [or, as subsequent
cases have established, an administrative regulation] cannot be upheld unless
the grounds upon which the agency
acted in exercising its powers were those
upon which its action can be sustained.”
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95
(1943), additional opinion, 332 U.S.
194 (1947).
Increased judicial suspicion of
agencies in the 1960s and 1970s gave
rise to more rigorous review known as
“hard look” review. Integral to such
review was scrutiny of the agency’s
asserted reasons for its choice and
correlation of those reasons with the
purposes of the statute—rationality
review. In the “hard look” tradition, the
Supreme Court decided the State Farm
case, repeating the Chenery injunction
and holding that “an agency must
cogently explain why it has exercised its
discretion in a given manner.” Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc.
v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983).

II. Obligation to Explain
in Mannella
Judge Ambro considered, and found
deficient, four rationales asserted by the
Government in support of the challenged
regulation: (1) the absence of a two-year
deadline for section 6015(f) claims would
render superfluous the statutory two-year
deadline for section 6015(b) claims, (2)
the Service can exercise its discretion
under section 6015(f) to exclude a class
of claimants (those who delay filing their
claims), (3) the regulation is an exercise
of the delegation to create procedures
governing relief, and (4) the regulations
reduce to manageable proportions the
volume of claims for relief.
More important than his particular
responses to the above rationales was
the general response Judge Ambro
essayed. In their various public pronouncements on the regulation, Treasury
and the Service stated no reasons for
imposing the two-year limitations period

as to section 6015(f) equitable claims.
Reasons were advanced in briefs in
Mannella, but under Chenery and State
Farm (both cited by Judge Ambro) post
facto justifications by lawyers for the
agency cannot take the place of
contemporaneous explanation by the
agency itself. E.g., State Farm, 463 U.S.
at 50 (“It is well established that an
agency’s action must be upheld, if at all,
on the basis articulated by the agency
itself.”).
Neither of the judges in the Mannella
majority responded to Judge Ambro’s
“failure to explain” argument. The
Government did not have the opportunity
to do so because, contrary to the usual
rules of appeals, Judge Ambro’s dissent
raised the argument sua sponte. It had
not appeared in the briefs or oral
argument in the case.
However, the Government’s opening
brief in Hall pending before the Sixth
Circuit did address the argument. There
have been many explanation cases since
State Farm was decided in 1983. The
Government argued in its Sixth Circuit
brief that, in light of Verizon (one of those
subsequent cases), “Judge Ambro’s
criticism is . . . completely misconceived.” Specifically, the Government
maintained that State Farm applies only
when an agency changes course, not
when it is “taking a position in the first
instance,” which it was in the section
6015(f) regulation. Brief of Appellant,
Hall v. Commissioner, No. 10-2628, at
58 (Jan. 26, 2011) (citing Verizon
Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S.
467, 502 n.20 (2002)).
I do not find the Government’s
response convincing. State Farm did
involve an agency changing its position,
but numerous other “hard look” and
explanation cases dealt with initial
positions, not changed positions. The
Government may be confusing what is
accidental in one case with what is
essential in a line of cases.
The Government’s argument is hard to
square with Fox, a 2009 Supreme Court
decision refining State Farm. The Fox
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Court said: “We find no basis in the
[APA] or in our opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review. . . .
[T]he agency need not always provide a
more detailed justification [for a change
of policy] than what would suffice for a
new policy created on a blank slate.”
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129
S. Ct. 1800, 1810–11 (2009). The
explanation obligation applies to initial
positions as well as to changed
positions.
If the response it essayed in Hall is
weak, does the Government have
available a better response to the “failure
to explain” argument? Perhaps so in the
Mannella context. The case law
recognizes various exceptions to the
explanation obligation. One exception is
situations in which it is obvious why the
choice was made. E.g., American
Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602
F.2d 256, 269 (Ct. Cl. 1979). This
accords with the venerable maxim that
the law does not command the commission of meaningless acts.
Arguably, this exception applies as to
the regulation imposing the two-year
limitations period with respect to section
6015(f) claims. Why are statutes of
limitation ever created? The two standard
reasons are finality and avoiding
decisions based on stale evidence.
Perhaps these purposes are so routine
that they are obvious reasons for the
two-year limit in the regulation.
This approach may gain additional
traction as a result of Mayo. Some courts
have used explanation failures as
independent, sufficient-unto-themselves
bases for invalidating regulations. Judge
Ambro did not; he deployed the failure
as part of his Chevron Step Two analysis.
In Mayo, the Supreme Court held that
Treasury may enlist enhanced administrability to establish the reasonableness
of a regulation at Step Two. Mayo, supra,
131 S. Ct. at 715. The perhaps obvious
finality and staleness reasons are part of
administrability.

Th e s e r vice t ra ces c lea rer d e fini tions I POI NT S TO REMEMBER

III. Obligation to Explain
in Future Tax Cases
Whatever the ultimate fate of Judge
Ambro’s contention in the section
6015(f) cases, does “failure to explain”
have a future in other cases? I think the
answer is “yes”—if taxpayers’ counsel
are willing to immerse themselves in
general administrative law enough to
argue the issue skillfully.
It is clear that general administrative
law does apply to tax rules and regulations. With exceptions not here relevant,
the APA applies to all federal agencies,
including Treasury and the Service. 5
U.S.C. § 551(1). Despite the desire of
some to deny it, it has long been clear
that tax is not exempt from general
administrative law. The Supreme Court’s
unanimous Mayo decision ends any
question in this regard. See Mayo, 131
S. Ct. at 712–13.
Moreover, Judge Ambro’s opinion is
not the first time the explanation

obligation has appeared in a tax case.
Some (though not many) previous cases
have addressed it. E.g., American
Standard, supra; Georgia Fed. Bank,
F.S.B. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 105,
110 (1992). More cases entailing
challenges to tax regulations would have
dealt with this issue had it been raised
more often by taxpayers’ counsel.
Mayo makes it more likely that
counsel will wade into these waters in
the future. In Mayo and in some other
cases, taxpayers challenging Treasury
regulations argued in part as follows:
(1) National Muffler, not Chevron,
provides the governing standard when
tax regulations (especially general
authority regulations promulgated under
section 7805(a)) are challenged;
(2) National Muffler is more rigorous
than Chevron; and (3) the challenged
regulation fails to pass muster under
National Muffler. National Muffler
Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States,
440 U.S. 472 (1979).

As I argue in my March Tax Notes
article, this argument was wrong and
contorted the real meaning of National
Muffler. In any event, the argument was
decisively rejected in Mayo. See 131 S.
Ct. at 711–14. It no longer is available to
taxpayers, creating the need for
aggrieved taxpayers to find other
doctrinal bottles into which to pour the
vinegar of their discontent.
That being so, one may expect
taxpayers—in addition to pressing
standard substantive contentions, such
as that the regulation is inconsistent with
the governing statute—to seek procedural grounds on which to attack
inconvenient regulations. One of those
grounds may be a Mannella-style
argument that Treasury failed to
adequately explain and justify the
choices it made in the regulation. It will
be interesting in the years to come to see
what develops along this front. n
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